> For the complete Linea documentation index, see [llms.txt](/llms.txt). > Agents can fetch this page as Markdown at [https://docs.linea.build/protocol/architecture/prover/trusted-setup.md](https://docs.linea.build/protocol/architecture/prover/trusted-setup.md). # Trusted setup Lineth uses structured reference strings (SRSs) produced by previously completed public multi-party computation (MPC) ceremonies. It does not depend on a Linea-operated ceremony or an active MPC network for normal proof generation. ## Reused public ceremonies The proving system uses ceremony outputs for three curves: | Curve | Use in the proving system | Public ceremony | | --- | --- | --- | | BN254 | Final and emulation proofs verified on Ethereum | [Aztec Ignition](https://github.com/AztecProtocol/ignition-verification), with 176 participants | | BLS12-377 | Execution and other inner wrapper proofs | [Aleo Setup I](https://github.com/AleoNet/aleo-setup), with 106 participants | | BW6-761 | Recursive aggregation proofs | [Celo Plumo](https://github.com/celo-org/snark-setup), with 55 participants | The [L2BEAT Linea prover catalog](https://l2beat.com/zk-catalog/lineaprover) documents the ceremony mapping and participant counts. The Lineth Prover source accepts SRS assets labeled `aztec`, `aleo`, and `celo` for these curves. ## Security assumption Each ceremony allowed participants to add private randomness to the SRS in sequence. The setup remains sound if at least one participant in each applicable ceremony generated their contribution honestly and destroyed the secret randomness afterward. A single honest contribution is sufficient to preserve the security of the SRS, even if every other contribution were compromised. If every contribution to an applicable ceremony were compromised, an attacker with the resulting secret could undermine proof soundness for proof layers that use that SRS. The ceremony repositories publish the contribution and verification procedures for their outputs. ## No ongoing MPC requirement Normal Lineth proving does not require ceremony participants to coordinate or contribute again. The Prover: 1. Loads the completed SRS assets from disk. 2. Uses PLONK setup to derive circuit-specific proving and verifying keys. 3. Generates proofs without involving the ceremony participants. Circuit changes can require regenerating circuit assets, proving keys, verifying keys, and the verifier contract. They do not require another MPC while the existing SRS supports the required circuit size and the same curve and commitment scheme remain in use. A change that requires a different curve, commitment scheme, or larger SRS requires a suitable new SRS, which may require another ceremony. ## Ethereum blob setup is separate EIP-4844 blob commitments use the separate [Ethereum KZG ceremony](https://ceremony.ethereum.org/), not the three proving-system SRSs listed above. That ceremony is complete and does not require ongoing MPC participation during normal blob use. ## See also - [Trace expansion and proving](/protocol/architecture/prover) - [Trust and responsibilities](/stack/evaluate/trust-model)